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Abstract—In social networks, by removing some target-sensitive links, privacy protection might be achieved. However, some hidden
links can still be re-observed by link prediction methods on observable networks. In this paper, the conventional link prediction method
named Resource Allocation Index (RA) is adopted for privacy attacks. Several defense methods are proposed, including heuristic and
evolutionary approaches, to protect targeted links from RA attacks via evolutionary perturbations. This is the first time to study privacy
protection on targeted links against link-prediction-based attacks. Some links are randomly selected from the network as targeted links
for experimentation. The simulation results on six real-world networks demonstrate the superiority of the evolutionary perturbation
approach for target defense against RA attacks. Moreover, transferring experiments show that, although the evolutionary perturbation
approach is designed to against RA attacks, it is also effective against other link-prediction-based attacks.
Index Terms—social network, link prediction, resource allocation index, target defense, evolutionary algorithm, transferability.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MANY complex systems in the real world can be rep-resented by networks, where the nodes denote the
entities in the real systems and links capture various rela-
tionships among them [1]–[4].
In network science, link prediction is a fundamental no-
tion, which attempts to uncover missing links or to predict
future interactions between pairwise nodes, based on ob-
servable links and other external information. Link predic-
tion has various applications in many fields, e.g., link pre-
diction itself can serve for network reconstruction [5], eval-
uating network evolving mechanism [6] and node classifi-
cation [7]. Besides, in protein-protein interaction networks,
link prediction can serve to guide the design of experiments
to find previously undiscovered interactions [8]. With the
boom of social media in recent years, service providers can
leverage social networks and other information to recom-
mend friends, commodities and advertisement that may
attract users [9]–[13]. This process can also be naturally
described as link prediction.
While various social media are enriching people’s
lives [14]–[16], there is an increasing concern about privacy
issues since more and more personal information could be
obtained by others online. In the field of social privacy
protection, many algorithms have been developed for pro-
tecting the privacy of users, such as identity, relationship
and attributes, from different situations in which different
• S. Yu, M. Zhao, C. Fu, H. Huang, X. Shu, and Q. Xuan
are with the College of Information Engineering, Zhejiang Uni-
versity of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China (e-mail: yushan-
qing@zjut.edu.cn, yzbyzmh1314@163.com, cbfu@zjut.edu.cn, saffron-
Huang@163.com, sxc.shuxincheng@foxmail.com, xuanqi@zjut.edu.cn).
• G. Chen is with the Department of Electronic Engineering, City
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China (e-mail:
eegchen@cityu.edu.hk).
• This article has been submitted on June 27th, 2018.
• Corresponding author: Qi Xuan.
public information was exposed to adversaries [17]–[20]. In
this paper, the focus is on preserving link privacy in social
networks.
In retrospect, Zheleva et al. [20] proposed the concept of
link re-identification attack, which refers to inferring sen-
sitive relationships from anonymized network data. If the
sensitive links can be identified by the released data, then
this means privacy breach. In early days, link perturbation
was considered a common technique to preserve sensitive
links [21], e.g., a data publisher can randomly remove real
links and insert fake links into an original network so as to
preserve the sensitive links from being identified. Zheleva
et al. [20] assumed that the adversary has an accurate proba-
bilistic model for link prediction, and they proposed several
heuristic approaches to anonymizing network data. Ying et
al. [22] investigated the relationship between the level of
link randomization and the possibility to infer the presence
of a link in a network. Further, Ying et al. [23] investigated
the effect of link randomization on protecting privacy of
sensitive links, and they found that similarity indices can be
utilized by adversaries to significantly improve the accuracy
in predicting sensitive links.
Differing from the above approaches, Fard et al. [24]
assumed that all links in a network are sensitive, and
they proposed to apply subgraph-wise perturbations onto
a directed network, which randomize the destination of
a link within some subnetworks thereby limiting the link
disclosure. Furthermore, they proposed neighborhood ran-
domization to probabilistically randomize the destination
of a link within a local neighborhood on a network [25].
It should be noted that both subnetwork-wise perturbation
and neighborhood randomization perturb every link in the
network based on a certain probability.
As discussed above, link prediction can be applied to
predict the potential relationship between two individuals.
From another perspective, it may also increase the risk of
link disclosure. Even if the data owner removes sensitive
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2links from the published network dataset, it may still be dis-
closed by link prediction and consequently lead to privacy
breach. Michael et al. [26] presented a link reconstruction at-
tack, which is a method that attacker can use link prediction
to infer a user’s connections to others with high accuracy,
but they did not mention how to defend the so-called link-
reconstruction attack. Naturally, one can consider finding
a way to prevent the link-prediction attack. Since link-
reconstruction attack or link-prediction-based attack aims
to find out some real but unobservable links, the defense of
link-prediction-based attacks is also target-directed, which
means that one has to preserve the targeted links from being
predicted. In the literature, most existing approaches on
link prediction are based on the similarity between pairwise
nodes under the assumption that the more similar a pair of
nodes are, the more likely a link exists between them.
In sociology, triadic closure is a popular concept to explain
the evolution of a social network, i.e., if the triad of three
individuals is not closed, then the person connected to the
other two individuals would like to close this triad in order
to achieve a closure in the relationship network [27]. Here,
triadic closure breeds several neighborhood-based indices to
measure the proximity of pairwise nodes. Zhou et al. [28]
compared several neighborhood-based similarity indices on
disparate networks, and they found that Resource Allocation
(RA) index behaves best. Recently, Lu¨ et al. [29] published
a survey on link prediction. In general, since many link
prediction algorithms are designed based on network struc-
tures, a data owner can add perturbations into the original
network to reduce the risk of targeted-link disclosure due to
link-prediction-based attacks.
Note that, since a major goal of publishing social net-
work data is to pursue useful and worthy research, one
needs to limit the level of link perturbation. This reveals that
the key of defending link-prediction-based attacks depends
on how to find Optimal Link Perturbation (OLP), which
takes the defense effect and the level of perturbation into
account, to invalid link prediction algorithms, so that the
removed sensitive links are hard to be correctly predicted.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are very few
studies on this perspective of conducting target defense
against link-prediction-based attacks. In this paper, the pro-
posed approach is to randomly select some links as sensitive
ones, assuming that the adversary employs the RA index to
predict the missing links. Several approaches are proposed,
including heuristic and evolutionary perturbations, to de-
fend the attacks. It will be further shown that this kind of
defense can also serve as a counterpart of link prediction
to evaluate the robustness or vulnerability of various link
prediction algorithms.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• A novel target defense method against link-
prediction-based attacks is proposed to hide the sen-
sitive links from being predicted.
• Techniques using heuristic as well as evolution-
ary perturbations to defend link-prediction-based
attacks are developed. With evolutionary perturba-
tions, a new fitness function is designed, taking
into consideration of both precision and AUC (area
under curve), which can reduce the calculation of
fitness values by computing the variation after per-
turbations. The experimental results demonstrate the
superiority of evolutionary perturbations, especially
using an EDA (estimation of distribution algorithm),
and it is found that the transfer effect is closely
related to the fitness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2,
the network model and some standard metrics about link
prediction are introduced. The proposed target defense
against link-prediction-based attacks is discussed. In Sec. 3,
several methods are developed, including heuristic and
evolutionary perturbations. In Sec. 4, empirical experiments
are conducted to examine the proposed methods, and the
experimental results are analyzed in detail. In Sec. 5, the pa-
per is concluded with some discussions on future directions
of research.
2 NETWORK MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
2.1 Network Model
An undirected network is presented by G(V,E), where V
and E denote the sets of nodes and links, respectively.
Define the set of all node pairs in the network by Ω =
{(i, j)|{i, j} ∈ V, i 6= j}. In an undirected network, link
(i, j) is considered the same as link (j, i) and Ω contains(k
2
)
= |V |(|V |−1)2 possible links. All observable links E
are divided into two groups: the training set ET and the
validation set EV , where ET ∪ EV = E and ET ∩ EV = ∅.
Furthermore, define the set of unknown node pairs and
the set of non-existent node pairs by U = Ω − ET and
N = Ω− E, respectively. Obviously, U = N + EV .
2.2 Link Prediction
In link prediction, the objective is to predict EV within U
utilizing the structure information provided by ET . There
are several metrics to measure the similarity of node pairs,
among which local indices are computationally efficient and
well-performed. According to [28] and [30], the RA index
stands out from several local similarity-based indices. It is
defined as follows:
RAxy =
∑
z∈Γ(x)∩Γ(y)
1
dz
, (1)
where Γ(x) denotes the one-hop neighbors of node x and
dz denotes the degree of node z. To reduce the RA value
of a certain node pair, one can decrease the number of
common neighbors between them or increase the degree of
their common neighbors.
In this paper, two standard metrics are used for measur-
ing the performance of link prediction, i.e., precision and
AUC (the area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve), which are defined as follows:
• Precision
Precision is the ratio of real missing links to pre-
dicted links. To calculate it, first sort node pairs in
U in descending order according to their similarity
values, as Uˆ , and then the top-k node pairs Uˆk in Uˆ
3are chosen as the predicted ones. The definition of
precision is
precision =
|Uˆk ∩ EV |
|EV | , (2)
where k = |EV | will be used in this paper.
• AUC
AUC measures the probability that a random missing
link in EV is given a higher similarity value than
a random non-existent node pair in N . To calculate
it, choose each missing link in EV and each non-
existent link in N to compare their values: if there
are n> times where a missing link has a higher value
and n= times their values are the same, then the AUC
is computed as follows:
AUC =
n> + 0.5n=
n
, (3)
where n = |EV | ∗ |N | will be used in this paper.
2.3 Target Defense in Link Prediction Attack
A new target defense method is proposed here against link-
prediction-based attacks. For instance, as shown in Fig. 1,
simply deleting the sensitive link (i, j) cannot make it
hidden, because the value of RAij is equal to 1, which
is much higher than other node pairs in the network. The
deleted link could be easily re-identified, if RA is employed
to predict missing links. However, if one deletes link (i, q)
and meanwhile inserts link (p, q), then RAij = 0.5, which
is similar to other node pairs.
i j i j
ji
a.  original   network b.  without  perturbation 
c.  with perturbation 
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d.  perturbed network 
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Fig. 1. The whole process of defending link-prediction-based attacks via
link perturbations. Red link (i, j) is sensitive, which needs to be hidden,
and green dashed link (p, q) is the inserted link. The released network
can preserve the sensitive link (i, j) from being identified by the RA
index, to some extent.
In a network G(V,E), the set E is divided into two
disjoint groups: ET and EV . Take EV as the set of sensitive
links. The set of link perturbations E˜ is added into ET ,
which means deleting Edel from ET and then inserting
Eadd into ET so as to reduce the rate that links in the set
of sensitive links being re-identified by a link prediction
algorithm L, which consequently leads to the risk of privacy
leakage.
Although the defensive effect may be improved as the
number of modified links increases, the number of modifi-
cations should be minimized, taking into account the cost
of perturbations and the utility of the perturbed network.
Therefore, the following two restricted conditions are con-
sidered:
• the numbers of deleted and inserted links should
be identical to make the total number of links un-
changed.
• the numbers of deleted and inserted links should be
sparse to ensure data utility.
Ut supra, target defense against link-prediction-based
attacks can be described mathematically as follows:
min
E˜
L(ET + E˜, EV )
s.t.
{
|E˜| = |Eadd|+ |Edel| = 2 · |Edel|  |ET |
Edel ⊂ ET , Eadd ⊂ N .
(4)
After being perturbed, ET , U and N of the original network
are changed to E˜T , U˜ and N˜ , respectively. It then follows
that
E˜T = ET − Edel + Eadd, (5)
U˜ = Ω− (ET + E˜) = U + Edel − Eadd, (6)
N˜ = Ω− (ET + E˜)− EV = N + Edel − Eadd . (7)
The relationship of each link set after a perturbation is
shown in Fig. 2, where the set of non-existent node pairs
before and after the perturbation are shown in grey.

TE
VE
N

TE
VE
N
addEdelE
E
Fig. 2. The venn diagram of each node-pair set after adding perturbation
E˜ into the original network.
3 METHODS
In this paper, assume that the adversary uses the RA index
to predict the missing links. The objective here is to preserve
EV from being predicted via adding link perturbations.
Then, random, heuristic and evolutionary perturbations are
applied, respectively, as discussed below.
3.1 Random Perturbations
3.1.1 Randomly Link Rewiring (RLR)
For a given network in which sensitive links are removed,
one can randomly delete some links `del from ET and then
insert the same number of new links `add, which exist in N .
43.1.2 Randomly Link Swapping (RLS)
Another common practice for randomizing a network is link
swapping, which not only keeps the total number of links
unchanged but also preserves the degrees of nodes [31].
As shown in Fig. 3, link swapping removes two randomly
chosen links from ET and creates two new links existing in
N before swapping.
i j
u v u v
i jLink Swap 
Fig. 3. An example for link swapping. If either (i, v) or (i, v) already exists
in ET , no swapping is performed, and another attempt is made to find a
suitable link pair.
3.2 Heuristic Perturbation
To hide the links in EV , one can degrade the performance
of link prediction through decreasing the similarity values
of node pairs in EV and then increasing the values of non-
existent node pairs. Here, a greedy strategy is adopted to
rewire links. First, the RA index is used to calculate the
similarity values of node pairs (i, j) ∈ Ω and then sort them
in descending order according to their values.
For each node pair (i, j) ∈ Ω, there are three cases, i.e.,
(i, j) ∈ ET , (i, j) ∈ N , and (i, j) ∈ EV . One can traverse
the ordered node pairs and conduct different operations by
deleting or inserting links for each case.
• (i, j) ∈ ET
If the current node pair (i, j) exists in ET , directly
delete the link. Because the deleted (i, j) will exist in
U˜ and (i, j) has a high RA value.
• (i, j) ∈ N
If the current node pair (i, j) exists in N , select the
node k whose degree is the smallest in the one-
hop neighborhoods of i and j, except their common
neighbors. Then, insert (i, k) or (j, k) to increase the
RA value of the current node pair (i, j).
• (i, j) ∈ EV
If the current node pair (i, j) exists in EV , select the
common neighbor k whose degree is the smallest
and then delete (i, k) or (j, k); or select two common
neighbors k and l whose degrees are among the
smallest. Then, insert (k, l) to reduce the RA value
of the node pair (i, j).
The above operation is shown in Fig. 4.
It should ensure that all deleted links `del ∈ EV and
inserted links `add ∈ N . The intact pseudo-codes of the
algorithms are described in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3.
3.3 Evolutionary Perturbations
Link perturbation can be treated as a combinatorial opti-
mization problem and the number of candidate combina-
tions of deleted/inserted links is Cm|ET | · Cm|N |, where m is
the number of deleted/inserted links.
i j
( , ) Ti j E
del
a
( , ) Vi j E
i j
del
c
ji
add
ji
( , )i j N
add
b
k
l
k
k
Fig. 4. Four different operations through deleting or inserting links for
(i, j) in corresponding situations.
Algorithm 1: Heuristic Perturbation (HP)
Input: ET , EV , N, Ω and m.
Output: Edel and Eadd.
1 Initialize Edel and Eadd;
2 sort Ω in descending order to get Ωˆ;
3 for each (i, j) ∈ Ωˆ do
4 if (i, j) ∈ ET ∪ EV then
5 if |Edel| < m then
6 `del = Delete Link((i, j));
7 Edel = Edel ∪ `del ;
8 continue;
9 end
10 end
11 if (i, j) ∈ EV ∪N then
12 if |Eadd| < m then
13 `add = Add Link((i, j));
14 Eadd = Eadd ∪ `add;
15 end
16 end
17 if |Edel| = m and |Eadd| = m then
18 Break;
19 end
20 end
21 return Edel and Eadd.
To hide sensitive links in EV , one needs to reduce the
possibility that these links can be predicted. Both AUC
and precision are indicators for evaluating the performance
of a link prediction algorithm. AUC evaluates the global
performance while precision focuses on pairs with highest
similarity values. Therefore, an evolutionary algorithm is
designed here to find OLP, considering both AUC and
precision together as the reduction objective.
Next, consider two evolutionary algorithms, i.e. Genetic
Algorithm (GA) and Estimation of Distribution Algorithm
(EDA). First, design the common chromosome, fitness and
selection operation.
• Chromosome
The chromosome consists of two parts: `idel ∈ ET
5Algorithm 2: Delete Link
Input: node pair (i, j)
Output: `del
1 if (i, j) ∈ ET then
2 ET = ET − (i, j);
3 return (i, j);
4 end
5 if (i, j) ∈ EV then
6 Find k = arg min
k
{dk|k ∈ Γ (i) ∩ Γ (j)};
7 Find l = arg max
l
{dl|l ∈ {i, j}};
8 if (k, l) exists then
9 ET = ET − (k, l) ;
10 return (k, l);
11 end
12 end
Algorithm 3: Add Link
Input: node pair (i, j)
Output: `add
1 if (i, j) ∈ EV then
2 Find k = arg min
k
{dk|k ∈ Γ (i) ∩ Γ (j)};
3 Find l = arg min
l
{dl|l ∈ {Γ (i) ∩ Γ (j)− k}};
4 if (k, l) exists and (k, l) /∈ EV then
5 ET = ET ∪ (k, l);
6 return (k, l);
7 end
8 end
9 if (i, j) ∈ N then
10 Find k =
arg min
k
{dk|k ∈ {Γ (i) ∪ Γ (j)− Γ (i) ∩ Γ (j)}};
11 if k exists then
12 ET = ET ∪ {(k, l)|(k, l) /∈ EV , l ∈ {i, j}};
13 return {(k, l)|(k, l) /∈ EV , l ∈ {i, j}};
14 end
15 end
and `iadd ∈ N , i = 1, 2, ...,m. The number of deleted
and inserted links are identical according to the
assumption. The diagram of chromosome is shown
in Fig. 5, where the length of chromosome depends
on the experimental setup.
• Fitness
Two major link prediction performance measures,
i.e. precision and AUC, are considered in the fitness
design. Note that directly taking both precision and
AUC as fitness is time-consuming. Thus, a new fit-
ness function is designed to simplify the calculation,
as follows:
max
`∈EV ,n∈N˜
Fitness = α ·
∑
n∈N˜
δ(RAn > max
`∈EV
{RA`})
+ (
1
|N˜ |
∑
n∈N˜
RAn − 1|EV |
∑
`∈EV
RA`) ,
(8)
where δ(x) is an indicator function: δ(x) = 1 when
1
del
2
del
1
add
3
del
4
del
5
del
2
add
3
add
4
add
5
add
Del
Add
Fig. 5. The diagram of chromosome in GA and EDA, respectively. It
consists of two parts, i.e. deleted links `del ∈ ET and inserted links
`add ∈ N .
x is true; otherwise, δ(x) = 0, and α is a tunable
parameter. The fitness function consists of two parts:
(1) denoting the number of non-existent links with
higher similarity values than the most predictable
sensitive pairs, which has greater influence on the
precision; (2) denoting the difference in the average
similarity values between non-existent pairs and sen-
sitive pairs, which affects the AUC more.
• Selection Operation
The selection operation is conducted on roulette. To
make the fitness values positive, apply exponential
transform (ex) to the fitness. At the same time, retain
nelite elites according to the fitness values.
• Mutation Operation
Select nmutation chromosomes based on the fitness
values for mutation operation. Then, traverse each
link in a chromosome and conduct mutation oper-
ation to it according to a mutation rate pm. Specif-
ically, one randomly replaces the deleted link `del
with another one from ET , and randomly replace
the inserted link `add with another one in N . If it
happens to encounter collision, that is, there exist
duplicate links in the chromosome, then repeat the
above operation until collision disappears.
3.3.1 Genetic Algorithm (GA)
• Crossover Operation
Single point crossover is used here and ncrossover
chromosomes are selected according to the values
of fitness and crossover rate pc. If it happens to
encounter collision, as shown in Fig. 6, retreat the
crossover operation of the duplicate red links.
2
del
3
del
4
del
5
del
6
del
7
del
8
del
9
del
2
del
8
del
4
del
9
del
6
del
7
del
3
del
5
del
1
del
1
del
1
del
1
del
parent_1 
offspring_1 
crossover 
offspring_2 
parent_2 
Fig. 6. Crossover of chromosomes in the perspective of deleted links.
Red genotype will encounter collision after a direct exchange.
6Algorithm 4: GA for Link Perturbation
Input: m, niteration, nelite, ncrossover, nmutation, pc,
and pm.
Output: population
1 Initialize population;
2 while not convergence or not reach to niteration do
3 calculate the fitness of population;
4 retain nelite elites;
5 Cro = Selection Operation(ncrossover);
6 ˆCro = Crossover Operation(pc, Cro);
7 Mut = Selection Operation(nmutation);
8 Mˆut = Mutation Operation(pm,Mut);
9 population = elites ∪ ˆCro ∪ Mˆut ;
10 end
11 return population;
Algorithm 5: EDA for Link Perturbation
Input: m, niteration, nelite, nestimation, neda,
nmutation, and pm.
Output: pop
1 Initialize population;
2 while not convergence or not reach to niteration do
3 calculate the fitness of population;
4 retain nelite elites;
5 ˆEda = Generate Population(nestimation, neda);
6 Mut = Selection Operation(nmutation);
7 Mˆut = Mutation Operation(pm,Mut);
8 population = elites ∪ ˆEda ∪ Mˆut ;
9 end
10 return pop;
3.3.2 Estimation of Distribution Algorithm (EDA)
EDA is a new kind of random optimization algorithm based
on statistics theory. EDA has obvious differences with GA.
As mentioned above, GA applies the crossover operation
to generate new individuals; however, EDA searches bet-
ter individuals through preference sampling and statistical
learning. Specifically, one samples nestimation individual
chromosomes according to their fitness values and then
estimates the probability distributions of the deleted links
P (`del) and inserted links P (`add) based on simple statistics.
Finally, one generates neda chromosomes according to their
respective distributions. The pseudo-codes of GA and EDA
are described in Algorithms 4, 5 and 6.
3.3.3 Accelerating the Fitness Calculation
Since one should calculate the fitness value for each individ-
ual at every iteration, the speed of fitness calculation directly
affects the computational efficiency of the evolutionary al-
gorithm. It is proposed here to accelerate the calculation of
fitness by only recalculating the increment of the original
network for each individual. Note that, for RA, deleting
(i, j) or inserting (i, j) only affects the values of one-hop
neighborhood.
THEOREM 1. Denote by N˜recalcij the set of node pairs whose RA
values need to be recalculated in N˜ . For the RA index, by either
Algorithm 6: Generate Population
Input: nestimation and neda.
Output: population
1 Initialize population;
2 Est = Selection Operation(nestimation);
3 Estimate the distributions of P (`del) and P (`del) by
statistical sampling, where P (`del) ≈ P (`del|Est)
and P (`del) ≈ P (`add|Est) ;
4 while not reach to neda do
5 Sample Edel and Eadd according to P (`del) and
P (`add) respectively to generate new individual;
6 end
7 return population;
deleting or inserting (i, j), one has |N˜recalcij | ≤ 12 (k2i +k2j +ki+
kj) + 1.
Proof. Assume that (u, v) ∈ N˜recalcij , and denote by G the
original network and by Γ(i) the one-hop neighbors of node
i in G.
First, consider (i, j) ∈ G, and delete (i, j) from G.
• u = i, v = j
Before deleting (i, j), one has (i, j) /∈ N ; after delet-
ing (i, j), one has (i, j) ∈ N˜ . Thus, RAuv needs to be
calculated.
• u 6= i, v 6= j
If i or j ∈ Γ(u) ∩ Γ(v) in G, then RAuv needs
to be recalculated after deleting (i, j) and (u, v) ∈
{(Γ(i),Γ(i)), (Γ(j),Γ(j))}; if {i, j} /∈ Γ(u) ∩ Γ(v)
in G, then RAuv needs not to be recalculated after
deleting (i, j).
• u 6= i, v = j
If i ∈ Γ(u) ∩ Γ(j) in G, then RAuv needs to be recal-
culated after deleting (i, j) and (u, v) ∈ {(Γ(i), j)};
if i /∈ Γ(u) ∩ Γ(j) in G, then RAuv needs not to be
recalculated after deleting (i, j).
• u = i, v 6= j
(u, v) ∈ {(i,Γ(j))} by symmetry.
To sum up, (u, v) ∈ {(i, j), (Γ(i),Γ(i)), (Γ(j),Γ(j)), (Γ(i), j),
(i,Γ(j))} and the same for inserting (i, j). Therefore,∣∣∣N˜recalcij ∣∣∣ ≤ 12ki(ki − 1) + 12kj(kj − 1) + (ki + kj) + 1
=
1
2
(k2i + k
2
j + ki + kj) + 1 . (9)
An example to illustrate the influence of deleting (i, j) is
shown in Fig. 7. The set N˜ of non-existent node pairs in the
perturbed network can be written as
N˜ = N + Edel − Eadd
= (N −Nrecalcij ) +Nrecalcij + (Edel − Eadd) . (10)
Thus, one only needs to recalculate the RA values inNrecalcij ,
Edel and Eadd, to update the fitness. Consequently, the
complexity of calculating the similarity values of node pairs
in the perturbed network is significantly reduced, approxi-
mately from O(|V |2) to O(m〈k〉2), where m is the number
of deleted/inserted links and 〈k〉 is the average degree of G.
7i j 
( )i
i
( )j
j
( )i
j ji
( )j
i
( )i
( )j
two-hop 
one-hop 
Fig. 7. Left: neighborhood of (i, j), where one-hop neighbors are within
the red dashed circle. Right: four kinds of node pairs whose RA values
need to be recalculated if (i, j) is deleted or inserted.
TABLE 1
Basic topological features of six networks. |V | and |E| are the numbers
of nodes and edges, respectively; 〈k〉 is the average degree; C is the
clustering coefficient and 〈d〉 is the average distance.
Mexican Dolphin Bomb Lesmis Throne Jazz
|V | 35 62 64 77 107 198
|E| 117 159 243 254 352 2742
〈k〉 6.686 5.129 7.594 6.597 6.597 27.697
C 0.448 0.259 0.622 0.573 0.551 0.617
〈d〉 2.106 3.357 2.691 2.641 2.904 2.235
4 EXPERIMENTS AND SIMULATION RESULTS
4.1 Data Description
Here, six networks are selected, with topological features
shown in TABLE 1.
• Mexican political elite (Mexican) is an undirected
network, which contains the core of the political elite
including the presidents and their closest collabo-
rators. Links represent significant political, kinship,
friendship, or business ties among them [32].
• Dolphin social network (Dolphin) is an undirected
social network of dolphins living in a community
and links present the frequent associations between
pair-wise dolphins [33].
• Train Bombing (Bomb) is an undirected network,
which contains contacts between suspected terrorists
involved in the train bombing of Madrid on March
11, 2004, as reconstructed from newspapers. Nodes
represent terrorists and link between two terrorists
means that there was a contact between them [34].
• Lesmis is an undirected network of characters in
Victor Hugo’s famous novel Les Miserables. Nodes
denote characters and two nodes are connected if
the corresponding characters co-appear in the same
chapter of the book [35].
• Game of Thrones (Throne) is an undirected network
of character interactions from the novel A Storm of
Swords, where nodes denote the characters in the
novel and a link denotes that two characters are
mentioned together in the text [36].
TABLE 2
Parameters settings for evolutionary algorithms, including GA and EDA,
in each network.
Item Meaning Value
α weight in fitness -
m number of deleted/inserted links -
niteration number of iterations 1000
eelite number of retained elites 10
ncrossover number of chromosomes for crossover 50
nmutation number of chromosomes for mutation 50
pc crossover rate 0.7
pm mutation rate 0.1
nestimation number of chromosomes for estimation 250
neda number of generated population in EDA 50
• Jazz is a collaboration network of jazz musicians.
Each node is a jazz musician and a link denotes that
two musicians have played together in a band [37].
4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Defense Effects of Various Link Perturbations
All links are randomly divided into 10 uniform and disjoint
sets. One of the sets is selected as a validation set EV to be
the set of sensitive links that need to be protected, and the
rest is used as a training set ET . Use the above-mentioned
five methods including random, heuristic and evolutionary
perturbations, respectively, to make a crosswise comparison.
In order that all links are used for both training and
validation set, a 10-fold cross-validation is used to calculate
the average precision and AUC. To ensure the sparsity of
the perturbations, the proportion of deleted and inserted
links in the training set are limited to observe the down-
trend of defense effect with an increasing proportion of
perturbations. The proportion is defined as the ratio of
deleted/inserted links to all links in the training set. For
example, if the proportion equals 0.1, it means that the
deleted and inserted links account for 10% of the training
set, respectively. To perform a reasonable comparison, add
the perturbations using different methods in the same train-
ing set and then calculate the precision and AUC in the same
validation set.
In Random Link Rewiring (RLR), randomly delete and
insert a certain proportion of links in each training set
and then repeat the procedure for one hundred times. In
Randomly Link Swapping (RLS), conducting link swapping
for one time means deleting two links and adding two other
links at the same time. So, one may conduct half times of link
swapping comparing to RLR and then repeat one hundred
times of the procedure in each training set. In Heuristic
Perturbation (HP), similarly conduct one hundred times of
the procedure and then obtain the average precision and
AUC. In GA and EDA, basic parameters of the evolutionary
algorithms are set to be the empirical values, as shown
in TABLE 2. The main parameter to be tuned is the α in
fitness, and the results are shown in TABLE 3. It can be seen
that there does not exist any fixed α that is optimal for all
networks. So, one may select the value of α separately for
each individual network. In the experiments, for Mexican,
Dolphin, Lesmis and Throne, set α = 0.01; for Bomb, set
α = 1; for Jazz, set α = 0. Then, repeat five times in each
8Fig. 8. Average precision of each network perturbed by different methods with increasing proportions of deleted and inserted links.
Fig. 9. Average AUC of each network perturbed by different methods with increasing proportions of deleted and inserted links.
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Average precision and AUC in each network with different values of α when the proportion of deleted and inserted equals 0.06.
Datasets(GA) Precision AUC
α = 0 α = 0.01 α = 0.1 α = 1 α = 0 α = 0.01 α = 0.1 α = 1
Mexican 0.0818 0.0364 0.0364 0.0364 0.708 0.740 0.758 0.754
Dolphin 0.0667 0.00667 0.00667 0 0.698 0.741 0.749 0.752
Bomb 0.379 0.329 0.288 0.288 0.878 0.899 0.908 0.910
Lesmis 0.272 0.252 0.244 0.248 0.872 0.879 0.899 0.898
Throne 0.0943 0.0971 0.111 0.114 0.835 0.863 0.869 0.876
Jazz 0.397 0.422 0.439 0.417 0.952 0.956 0.958 0.958
Datasets(EDA) Precision AUC
α = 0 α = 0.01 α = 0.1 α = 1 α = 0 α = 0.01 α = 0.1 α = 1
Mexican 0.0727 0.0273 0.0273 0.0364 0.701 0.745 0.744 0.744
Dolphin 0.0533 0.00667 0.00667 0 0.689 0.736 0.748 0.752
Bomb 0.392 0.317 0.225 0.129 0.867 0.897 0.909 0.905
Lesmis 0.276 0.224 0.156 0.0680 0.859 0.894 0.889 0.889
Throne 0.0886 0.0771 0.0314 0.0343 0.816 0.884 0.879 0.869
Jazz 0.401 0.434 0.429 0.425 0.951 0.959 0.957 0.955
Fig. 10. Average running time of GA and EDA with the same parameters
in two networks before and after accelerating the fitness calculation.
training set and calculate the average precision and AUC of
the optimal individuals in the final population.
The final results are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, from
which it is found that evolutionary perturbations, especially
those obtained by EDA, are superior to RLR, RLS and HP
on most network datasets. The simulation results also show
that the effect of HP is getting better as the proportion of
perturbations increases. Especially, in a larger scale network
with a larger validation setEV , HP even outperforms evolu-
tionary methods when measured in precision. Larger-scale
perturbations in larger-scale networks mean that the search
space is larger. Correspondingly, increasing the scale of the
evolutionary method, e.g. increasing the numbers of indi-
viduals and iterations, may yield better results. However,
time consumption can also exceed the allowable tolerance.
Clearly, improving evolutionary methods or introducing
parallel computing may reduce time consumption, which
will be left for future studies.
Moreover, the running time before and after accelerating
the fitness calculation has also been compared. In Fig. 10,
experiments on GA and EDA with the same parameters in
the two different networks indicate that the computational
efficiency is increased significantly after acceleration.
4.2.2 Transferability of Evolutionary Perturbation
Although the above algorithms defend against specific link-
prediction-based attacks (RA), an adversary may use other
methods to do link prediction. Hence, it is desirable to
know the transferability of the evolutionary perturbation
especially acquired from EDA by checking the performance
of other link prediction algorithms. For this purpose, the
final perturbed networks obtained with the maximum per-
turbation generated by EDA together with HP are retained
for each network, for which five different similarity indices
are selected as test indices, which are Common Neighbors
(CN), Jaccard, Preferential Attachment (PA), Adamic-Adar
(AA) and Local Path (LP) [29], to calculate the average
precision and AUC of the perturbed networks.
The results are summarized in TABLE 4. One can see
that the transferability of EDA is better, no matter whether
it is measured by precision or by AUC, comparing to the
random perturbation (RLR/RLS) and heuristic perturbation
(HP), in most networks. However, it can also be found that,
in some cases, the transfer effect of EDA is inferior even than
RLS when checked by LP, which may be due to the fact that
LP considers the higher-order similarity of node pairs while
the fitness of EDA only considers one-hop neighbors, which
limits its transfer effect.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH OUTLOOK
In this paper, a target defense algorithm against link-
prediction-based attacks is proposed for social networks.
Both heuristic and evolutionary perturbations techniques
are used, taking into account both defense effect and data
utility. A special fitness function is designed, which can
simultaneously measure two link prediction indices, i.e.
precision and AUC, and can reduce computation time by
calculating variations after perturbations. The experimental
results on six real-world networks show that evolutionary
perturbations, especially those obtained by EDA, outper-
form other baseline methods, for both precision and AUC
measures, in most cases. Finally, the transfer effect of evolu-
tionary perturbations generated by EDA is verified, show-
ing that evolutionary perturbations are transferable and can
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TABLE 4
Transferability of perturbations generated by HP and EDA measured by different similarity indices for each network. HP (RA) means HP is based
on RA and EDA (RA) means that the fitness of EDA is based on RA as well.
Mexican Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.155 0.125 0.128 0.0182 0 0.777 0.734 0.732 0.721 0.495
CN 0.118 0.0993 0.106 0.0273 0 0.760 0.720 0.715 0.702 0.516
Jaccard 0.109 0.0876 0.0796 0.0273 0 0.752 0.709 0.701 0.693 0.496
PA 0.0546 0.0677 0.0596 0.0364 0.0300 0.625 0.616 0.625 0.588 0.557
AA 0.127 0.120 0.119 0.0182 0 0.776 0.733 0.731 0.721 0.504
LP(α = 0.5) 0.127 0.0896 0.105 0.0545 0.0165 0.729 0.692 0.682 0.684 0.564
Dolphin Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.107 0.0865 0.0885 0.00667 0 0.765 0.740 0.740 0.701 0.629
CN 0.113 0.0953 0.0954 0.0333 0 0.760 0.736 0.736 0.700 0.648
Jaccard 0.113 0.0920 0.0973 0.0200 0.00455 0.760 0.737 0.736 0.699 0.651
PA 0.0133 0.0121 0.0132 0 0 0.623 0.616 0.623 0.589 0.583
AA 0.133 0.0978 0.0999 0.0133 0 0.765 0.741 0.741 0.702 0.632
LP(α = 0.5) 0.120 0.107 0.103 0.0533 0.0226 0.792 0.768 0.762 0.772 0.711
Bomb Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.713 0.395 0.438 0.104 0.00182 0.929 0.909 0.904 0.903 0.891
CN 0.571 0.452 0.483 0.271 0.317 0.915 0.897 0.888 0.891 0.883
Jaccard 0.475 0.359 0.327 0.292 0.274 0.912 0.894 0.886 0.876 0.874
PA 0.229 0.186 0.219 0.138 0.139 0.774 0.767 0.774 0.749 0.744
AA 0.658 0.459 0.498 0.200 0.197 0.926 0.907 0.901 0.902 0.891
LP(α = 0.5) 0.488 0.379 0.389 0.404 0.325 0.880 0.864 0.848 0.868 0.851
Lesmis Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.540 0.365 0.378 0.180 0.0199 0.914 0.898 0.896 0.891 0.879
CN 0.484 0.359 0.357 0.204 0.182 0.906 0.895 0.888 0.881 0.881
Jaccard 0.0360 0.202 0.0606 0.0920 0.114 0.914 0.870 0.859 0.854 0.850
PA 0.104 0.0936 0.102 0.0800 0.0768 0.782 0.780 0.782 0.768 0.777
AA 0.524 0.380 0.378 0.192 0.111 0.912 0.898 0.893 0.888 0.886
LP(α = 0.5) 0.376 0.311 0.300 0.316 0.236 0.875 0.871 0.856 0.867 0.869
Throne Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.274 0.180 0.198 0.0343 0.0291 0.912 0.878 0.875 0.873 0.859
CN 0.200 0.174 0.181 0.109 0.103 0.892 0.865 0.859 0.849 0.847
Jaccard 0.0600 0.0553 0.0414 0.0543 0.0357 0.861 0.837 0.825 0.813 0.813
PA 0.123 0.110 0.122 0.100 0.0929 0.769 0.767 0.769 0.764 0.754
AA 0.240 0.192 0.203 0.0486 0.0814 0.908 0.878 0.873 0.869 0.859
LP(α = 0.5) 0.163 0.145 0.157 0.117 0.116 0.867 0.852 0.838 0.860 0.845
Jazz Precision AUC
original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA) original RLR RLS HP(RA) EDA(RA)
RA 0.512 0.390 0.395 0.172 0.327 0.960 0.950 0.948 0.946 0.940
CN 0.497 0.382 0.378 0.237 0.335 0.954 0.938 0.930 0.933 0.929
Jaccard 0.512 0.390 0.398 0.275 0.342 0.960 0.945 0.942 0.926 0.938
PA 0.132 0.121 0.130 0.106 0.112 0.770 0.761 0.769 0.746 0.752
AA 0.518 0.391 0.391 0.220 0.336 0.961 0.944 0.938 0.939 0.935
LP(α = 0.5) 0.359 0.295 0.281 0.265 0.264 0.908 0.889 0.874 0.902 0.882
be used to defend other link-prediction-based attacks when
the similarity measure is closely related to the fitness index.
However, for large-scale networks, especially when the
number of links to be hidden is very large, the proposed
algorithm does not take advantage of the network struc-
ture, consequently the evolutionary efficiency is limited.
Therefore, improving evolutionary methods or introducing
parallel computing so as to reduce computation time are
good topics for future studies.
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